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Foreword 
Each year the Centre for Monetary Economics (CME) appoints an independent group of 
experts to examine monetary policy in Norway. This year the group consists of the fol-
lowing: Professor Marvin Goodfriend of the Tepper School of Business, Carnegie   
Mellon University, Knut Anton Mork, Chief Economist for Norway in Handelsbanken, 
and Ulf Söderström, Assistant Professor of Economics at Bocconi University in Milan,     
Italy. The committee is solely responsible for the report and the views presented within. 
The report does not necessarily represent the views of CME or its members. 
 
 
  
 
Oslo, 19 February 2007 
Centre for Monetary Economics 
Arne Jon Isachsen 
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Mandate for Norges Bank Watch 2007 
The objective of the Norges Bank Watch report of 2007 is to evaluate Norges Bank's 
conduct of monetary policy, given the mandate for the monetary policy set by the Gov-
ernment in March 2001. The committee should evaluate if the objectives stated in the 
monetary policy mandate concur with those expressed by Norges Bank and whether 
Norges Bank uses its policy instruments efficiently in order to achieve the relevant ob-
jectives.  
 
The committee should also address other issues that it may find relevant for the present 
conduct of monetary policy. 
 
Finally, the committee should evaluate the communication strategy of Norges Bank.  
 
The report shall be presented at a press conference no later than 1 June 2007. 
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Executive Summary 
The Norwegian economy presents some unique challenges for monetary policy, not 
only because it is smaller and more open than most, but also because of the many sup-
ply shocks that the country has experienced in recent years, such as the rise in oil prices, 
the sharp decline in the prices of imported consumer goods, the substantial inflow of 
foreign workers, and important productivity improvements in key sectors. This contrasts 
with the common emphasis on demand shocks in monetary-policy studies and serves as 
an important reminder that the objective of monetary policy is not to prevent business-
cycle fluctuations, but to help the economy attain its full potential. In the presence of 
supply shocks, this potential does not develop smoothly over time, but is itself subject 
to fluctuations. 
To structure our thoughts, we base our evaluation of Norwegian monetary policy 
on a conceptual discussion of the underlying purpose of inflation targeting. Our evalua-
tion then gives rise to a number of recommendations, some of which could be put into 
effect immediately and others that should be carefully evaluated whether or not they de-
serve to be implemented. After summarizing the conceptual framework, we collect our 
discussion and recommendations under four headings: Mandate, Institutions, and Com-
munication; Forecasting; Data; and Research Direction. 
1. Inflation Targeting, Welfare, and Credibility: Conceptual Discussion 
It is mainly for practical reasons that inflation targeting has become the dominant strat-
egy of monetary policy around the world. Nevertheless, monetary theory has played, 
and continues to play, an important supporting role, because it serves as a basis for dis-
cussions of policy among academic economists, market participants, and central bank-
ers. In recent years, monetary theory has converged on a benchmark consensus model 
for monetary policy. We employ this model to provide a conceptual understanding of 
how inflation targeting works, and as a basis for our evaluation and assessment of infla-
tion targeting in Norway. 
The conceptual basis of our report is the modern consensus model of monetary pol-
icy known alternatively as the New Neoclassical Synthesis or the New Keynesian 
model, now recognized internationally as the foundation for inflation targeting. The 
New Synthesis model implies that low and stable inflation best minimizes macroeco-
nomic inefficiencies due to price and wage stickiness. The key is that monetary policy 
should target an index of the prices of goods and services which exhibit significant 
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stickiness, i.e., prices that firms find too costly to adjust flexibly to changing economic 
conditions, to minimize the need for those prices to adjust. As a practical matter, the 
idea is to target an index of sticky prices in order to anchor inflation expectations and 
provide a firm nominal anchor for monetary policy around which flexible prices are free 
to adjust. 
In this manner, inflation targeting makes aggregate output fluctuate much like a 
flexible-price real business cycle. Although the real business cycle model may have had 
somewhat limited success in explaining actual business cycles, we consider it an excel-
lent normative benchmark for how the economy can function under monetary policy of 
successful inflation targeting. Thus, low and stable inflation is not a goal in itself, but an 
important means to allow the economy to make the best possible use of its resources. 
This goal cannot always be reached perfectly. For example, wage stickiness may 
give rise to short-run tradeoffs between inflation and employment if an outright fall in 
nominal wages is required to stabilize inflation. In such cases, monetary policy must 
temporarily weigh the goal of low and stable inflation against the goal of employment 
stabilization. This is the essence of flexible inflation targeting. 
In practice, there are degrees of price stickiness in an economy. The logic of the 
benchmark model is that flexible prices should not be included in the price index tar-
geted by the central bank. Thus, the main purpose of monetary policy should be to use 
inflation targeting as a nominal anchor for prices in those sectors where stickiness is the 
most prevalent. Once this core of sticky prices is effectively anchored, flexible prices 
can be free to adjust on their own. 
To secure the credibility of a central bank’s commitment to low inflation, inflation 
targeting needs strong institutional support. A central bank should have the operational 
independence to use its interest rate policy instrument flexibly and aggressively if 
needed, it should have the support of a legislative mandate directing it to target infla-
tion, though flexibly, it should be held accountable by the government for this mandate, 
and it should be transparent to help secure the credibility of its inflation target. 
Inflation targeting needs structural models, forecasting models, and reliable macro-
economic data––to evaluate quantitatively the state of the economy, to indicate infla-
tionary forces that policy has to offset, and to determine the interest rate policy actions 
needed to do the job. Careful consideration must be given to the construction of the core 
price index to target, in part because the boundary between sticky and flexible prices is 
a matter of judgment in practice. Once this choice has been made clear, however, a cen-
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tral bank can utilize a variety of measures of inflation other than the core index to help 
judge inflation or deflation pressures and act against them. In addition, it should utilize 
a variety of goods and labor market indicators of inflation pressure to enable interest 
rate policy actions to be taken preemptively against deviations of inflation from the tar-
get. 
The closed-economy benchmark consensus model is a useful starting point for 
thinking about inflation targeting. However, for our evaluation of monetary policy in 
Norway, we need to consider a small open economy extension of the benchmark model. 
In principle, the index to target should only include domestically-produced goods and 
services. In practice, however, especially in the Norwegian context, there may be good 
reasons to include at least some import prices. 
For inflation targeting to work well, the central bank must allow the foreign ex-
change rate to float. However, exchange rate flexibility is not a goal in itself, but a nec-
essary prerequisite for monetary policy to help the real economy function efficiently. 
Monetary policy must take account of the indirect effects that shocks and policy actions 
themselves have on targeted core inflation and employment, in part, through their effect 
on the foreign exchange rate. Shocks to the terms of trade and other international factors 
play an especially important role in a small open economy. Nevertheless, the fundamen-
tal principle of monetary policy carries over from the benchmark closed-economy 
model: the flexible targeting of core inflation, with the help of international factors to 
judge inflationary pressures in the non-traded, sticky price sector, delivers welfare-
maximizing monetary policy. 
2. Mandate, Institutions, and Communication 
Regulation on Monetary Policy 
Any evaluation of a central bank’s performance needs to be based on the Bank’s formal 
mandate. However, for such an evaluation to be meaningful, the mandate needs to be 
clear. In this regard, we see some problems for the case of Norges Bank, whose formal 
mandate is contained in the Regulation on Monetary Policy. First, the Regulation’s fo-
cus on stability in the Norwegian krone’s national and international value is internally 
inconsistent. It is impossible to stabilize both inflation and the exchange rate in the 
presence of terms of trade shocks. Furthermore, there are signs that the interest rate 
forecasts published by Norges Bank are not entirely believed by market participants. 
We suspect this is because market participants perceive a constraint on Norges Bank’s 
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policy related to the explicit mention of the exchange rate in the mandate. Certainly, 
monetary policy should take into account effects on inflation and employment that 
come via the exchange rate. However, it is essential to dispel any suspicion of a con-
straint on inflation targeting due to a separate objedtive for the exchange rate or a sepa-
rate regard for specific industries.  
• We recommend that references to the exchange rate be removed from the 
Regulation to strengthen the credibility of the inflation target. 
Second, the level of the inflation target—2.5%—makes Norway stand out from most 
other economies with formal inflation targets, for which 2% has become the de facto 
standard. Although there may have been good reasons for choosing this level in 2001––
for example, to accommodate the expected real appreciation resulting from a systematic 
fiscal expansion––we find these arguments unconvincing today.  
• We recommend that the inflation target be reduced to 2%. 
Third, while stipulating the inflation target as “annual consumer price inflation,” the 
Regulation is not explicit on the specific index to be targeted. The mandate allows Nor-
ges Bank to ignore “the direct effects on consumer prices resulting from changes in in-
terest rates, taxes, excise duties and extraordinary temporary disturbances.” The under-
lying theory suggest, however, that the case for inflation targeting is derived from 
nominal stickiness, so that targeting should be aimed at those prices whose movements 
are most clearly hampered by stickiness. 
• We recommend that the inflation target be defined explicitly in terms of a 
core index of consumer prices of those sectors most affected by price sticki-
ness. 
We would like to encourage Norges Bank and the Government to explore the possi-
bility of targeting an index of the consumer prices of domestically produced, non-
energy goods, adjusted for indirect taxes. We expect such an index to cover most of the 
markets where price stickiness is prevalent, and monetary policy would be able to stabi-
lize such a price index more readily than one including imported goods. For this transi-
tion to be possible, Statistics Norway would need to publish such an index. 
• We recommend that Norges Bank and the Government explore the possibil-
ity of targeting an index of the consumer prices of non-energy, domestically 
produced goods and services, adjusted for indirect taxes. 
Finally, the Regulation only asks for consumer price inflation to be approximately 
2.5% without specifying what “approximately” means. The Government White Paper of 
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March 2001 specifies a range of acceptable inflation fluctuations of ±1 percentage point 
around the target. We believe that this range should be formally included in the Regula-
tion. Accountability is important for an inflation-targeting regime to be successful. This 
requires clear criteria on which the outcome of monetary policy can be judged. A target 
range would also facilitate flexibility in the targeting of inflation as well as accountabil-
ity by allowing for incremental criticism of Norges Bank if inflation moved to the edge 
of the target range. We believe it is important that criticism can be formulated incre-
mentally, in other words, that the government be able to criticize the central bank with-
out that criticism being read as a signal of total system failure or indeed an indication 
that the Governor should resign.  
• We recommend that the Regulation include a fluctuation band of ± 1 per-
centage point around the inflation target. 
For the credibility of inflation targeting, it is also important that the central bank’s 
mandate be stable. Large changes should thus not be undertaken too often.  
• Major revisions of the framework within which monetary policy is con-
ducted should be undertaken infrequently and only with good reason so as 
not to undermine the credibility of the inflation targeting regime. 
 
Monetary Policy Institutions 
There is widespread agreement that central banks should be operationally independent 
from politics. However, Norges Bank does not have full operational independence be-
cause the Bank must inform the Ministry of Finance before making important decisions 
(including interest-rate decisions), and because the Government has the right to instruct 
Norges Bank. The right to instruct constitutes an unusual restriction on central bank in-
dependence which may strain the credibility of monetary policy. 
• We recommend that the Government’s right to instruct Norges Bank be abol-
ished and that the meeting between the Governor and the Minister on the day 
before the Executive Board meeting be discontinued.  
The Executive Board has decided against publishing minutes or voting records from 
its meetings, and the external members of the Executive Board do not discuss monetary 
policy issues in public. These decisions place restrictions on the transparency of the de-
cision process and do not serve to enhance credibility and public trust that decisions are 
well-balanced. 
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• We recommend that the Bank publish non-attributed minutes and attributed 
voting records from Executive Board meetings, and that also external mem-
bers explain their views in public. 
Communication 
Earlier Norges Bank Watch groups have commended Norges Bank on its communica-
tion with markets and the public, most recently for releasing forecasts of the policy in-
terest rate. While these commendations are well deserved, we think that Norges Bank 
should release more of the ex ante information used to reach its policy decisions. This 
includes a clearer exposition of the role and explanation of the Bank’s use of models of 
various kinds as well as the quantitative reasoning behind judgments made to amend or 
override the models. Such information will improve the capacity of outsiders to rea-
sonably evaluate Norges Bank’s policy decisions. 
• We recommend that Norges Bank make more fully available the ex ante in-
formation employed in policy decisions. 
On the other hand, some users, such as financial market participants, have a need for 
a more succinct presentation of the main arguments behind the Bank’s decisions than 
what is currently available. The succinctness of the inflation reports could be improved 
further if the reasons underlying the Bank’s decisions are related more closely to its 
models and judgment. Also, we see some risk of misunderstanding in the repeated use 
of special phrases describing current policy, such as “small and not too frequent steps” 
or “it is unlikely that rates will be raised at every monetary policy meeting.” We fur-
thermore feel the publication of the Bank’s own interest rate forecast greatly reduces the 
need for such phrases.  
• We recommend that Norges Bank make its press releases and inflation re-
ports more concise by providing brief executive summaries and by relating 
the reasoning underlying its decisions more closely to its models and judg-
ment. 
• Special phrases such as “in small and not too frequent steps” should be used 
sparingly. 
3. Forecasting 
Because monetary policy under inflation targeting is forward looking, it needs to be 
based on forecasts of how the course of the economy is likely to evolve. Good forecasts 
require good models as well as good judgment. The Bank must and does employ a 
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structural model to ensure that its forecasts of inflation, the output gap, the interest rate, 
and the exchange rate are internally consistent, and that they are consistent with good 
monetary policy. However, structural models do not always forecast well compared 
with pure forecasting models that are less constrained by economic theory. This may 
partly explain why the structural model currently used by the Bank for forecasting has 
over-predicted inflation and under-predicted its uncertainty. It may also explain why the 
Bank currently forecasts very little change in the exchange rate despite an expected shift 
to a large positive interest rate differential vis-à-vis trading partners over the coming 
years. Although atheoretical, statistical forecasting models are no substitute for struc-
tural models when it comes to policy decisions, they should used to form judgment 
about how the predictions of structural models should be amended. 
Given Norges Bank’s objective of flexible inflation targeting, forecasts of the output 
gap—and thus of potential output in addition to actual output—are almost as important 
as the inflation forecasts. However, the Bank only publishes forecasts of the output gap 
and not current estimates or forecasts of actual and potential output. Forecasts of poten-
tial output, as well as estimates of its current level, are always subject to significant un-
certainty, which Norges Bank should note. Furthermore, potential output must not be 
assumed to follow a smooth trend over time. This is particularly important for the Nor-
wegian economy, where supply shocks that move potential output seem to be prevalent.  
With regard to forecasting and analysis at the Bank, we therefore recommend the 
following: 
• Norges Bank should employ atheoretical statistical forecasting methods to 
help quantify the judgment that amends its structural forecasts. 
• Norges Bank should publish in its inflation reports estimates and projections 
of actual and potential output with some indication of the statistical uncer-
tainty surrounding each, in addition to publishing estimates of current and fu-
ture output gaps. 
• Norges Bank should provide more quantitative detail underlying the ex-
change rate forecast and its relation to the projection for the interest rate. 
4. Data 
Flexible inflation targeting is quite demanding in terms of economic data. Although 
Norway has a long and distinguished tradition of economic data production, we see 
room for improvement. These improvements need to come from Statistics Norway. 
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Exploration of the possibility of defining the inflation target in regard to a core index 
of the type that we suggest above requires that Statistics Norway publish a price index 
for non-energy domestically produced consumer goods and services, adjusted for indi-
rect taxes. Currently, Norges Bank looks at a number of alternative measures of under-
lying inflation, such as trimmed means and volatility-weighted indices. Such indices are 
useful to help forecast the direction of the targeted core index. 
• We recommend that Statistics Norway construct and release monthly an in-
dex of the prices of non-energy domestically produced goods and services, 
adjusted for indirect tax changes. 
• We also recommend that Statistics Norway publish monthly alternative 
measures of underlying inflation, such as trimmed means and volatility-
weighted indices. 
The ILO-compatible labor market survey is carried out on such a small sample that 
the data are released only as three-month moving averages. Furthermore, the population 
underlying the samples of this survey excludes ex ante guest workers unless they have 
taken up domicile in Norway. Productivity statistics are not published on a regular ba-
sis, although they can be constructed by the user, which Norges Bank does. The only 
complete wage statistics are annual and constructed by a committee including members 
from the social partners. Capacity utilization is currently published indirectly as part of 
the Business Tendency Survey for manufacturing, mining, and quarrying, but curiously 
not for oil and gas extraction. Moreover, the figures are typically given as percentages 
of firms that find capacity to be a constraining factor for output growth, not as a per-
centage of capacity utilization itself.  
We therefore recommend that  
• The ILO-compatible survey be expanded into a true monthly survey and 
preferably include foreign workers. It should furthermore be supplemented 
by a monthly—or, at least, quarterly—establishment survey patterned on the 
one by the same name in the United States. Comprehensive wage statistics 
can be consolidated into this survey. 
• Statistics Norway publish productivity statistics on a regular basis. The pro-
ductivity and wage data can then be combined into estimates of unit labor 
costs and, in turn, pricing markups. 
• Capacity utilization statistics be improved by including the oil and gas sector 
and expressed as a percentage of capacity utilization.  
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Forward-looking policy must be based not only on good forecasts, but also on a 
good assessment of the current state of the economy. International experience suggests 
that surveys often provide the best indications about the current state of the economy. 
However, we are struck by the paucity of such data in Norway.   
• We recommend that Statistics Norway conduct regular surveys of purchas-
ing managers and consumer confidence according to international standards. 
5. Research Direction 
Norges Bank has made great strides in recent years building up a research-based model 
apparatus. The Bank’s researchers participate actively in the international research 
community. We believe that two areas should be strengthened in future research. First, 
because Norway is a rather small and extremely open economy, research on monetary 
policy in small and open economies should receive special emphasis. Second, we would 
like to see empirical research on wage and price stickiness and flexibility in Norway. 
Such findings should provide information on which prices need to be included in the in-
dex targeted by monetary policy. 
• We recommend that Norges Bank strengthen its research on monetary policy 
in small, open economies.  
• We would also like to see empirical research on wage and price stickiness 
and flexibility in Norway with a view to providing guidance on which prices 
to include in the index targeted by monetary policy. 
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Introduction 
The Norwegian economy presents some unique challenges for monetary policy, not 
only because it is smaller and more open than most, but also because of the many sup-
ply shocks that the country has experienced in recent years, such as the rise in oil prices, 
the sharp decline in the prices of imported consumer goods, the substantial inflow of 
foreign workers, and important productivity improvements in key sectors. This contrasts 
with the common emphasis on demand shocks in monetary-policy studies and serves as 
an important reminder that the objective of monetary policy is not to prevent business-
cycle fluctuations, but to help the economy attain its full potential. In the presence of 
supply shocks, this potential does not develop smoothly over time, but is itself subject 
to fluctuations. 
Furthermore, important recent shocks to the Norwegian economy have not been ag-
gregate shocks, but have affected different sectors differently. It has called for changes 
in relative prices, for example, by making apparel and air fare cheaper and energy goods 
more expensive relative to other goods and services. Thus, although sectoral policy is 
not the domain of central banks, these shocks raise the question of how monetary policy 
can help the economy adapt to such shocks. 
In order to study these issues, we have had to move beyond our main charge, formu-
lated in our mandate as “to evaluate Norges Bank’s conduct of monetary policy, given 
the mandate … set by the Government.” That is, we have had to evaluate the mandate 
itself. In that regard, we follow the tradition of several earlier Norges Bank Watch 
groups. We furthermore justify it from our mandate’s invitation to “address other issues 
that [the committee] may find relevant for the present conduct of monetary policy.”  
In so doing, we believe our exercise can offer important insights. Most importantly, 
we have attempted to review, on a fundamental basis, the underlying purpose of infla-
tion targeting. Low and stable inflation is not a goal in itself. Rather, it represents a con-
tribution to economic welfare, a help towards the efficient allocation of resources for the 
production and consumption of real goods and services. The ultimate goal is an envi-
ronment where the economy’s potential can be utilized to the maximum extent possible 
in a sustainable manner. Monetary policy certainly cannot do this alone. Fiscal policy, 
trade policy, competition policy, and other regulatory policy are needed as well. How-
ever, monetary policy is uniquely suited to address one particular problem, namely, the 
inefficiencies caused by price and wage stickiness in the presence of inflation or defla-
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tion. The cure that monetary policy can offer for stickiness is to anchor nominal prices 
to a credible inflation target. 
Although Norwegian monetary policy works well in this regard, we believe im-
provements can be made, several of which require changes in Norges Bank’s mandate. 
The references to the exchange rate as a separate objective should be taken out, and the 
operative inflation target should be lowered from 2.5% to the 2% that has become the de 
facto international standard. Furthermore, we recommend that the Government explore 
the possibility of redefining the inflation target in terms of a core index of consumer 
prices of those sectors most affected by stickiness. We suspect that this mainly means 
the consumer prices of domestically produced goods and services. 
However, we have also reviewed the conduct of Norwegian monetary policy in 
2006. From the information that Norges Bank has made available, we do not feel we 
can attempt to recreate the environment surrounding each policy decision. Thus, rather 
than evaluating policy in view of ex ante information, which we would have preferred, 
we have sought to discuss the general issues involved in formulating policy in the face 
of the kind of shocks that the Norwegian economy has been facing. In general, we feel 
Norges Bank’s actions fit well with the conclusions we draw from this discussion. 
Our mandate finally asks us to “evaluate the communication strategy of Norges 
Bank.” On this front, we notice one major recent change in that 2006 has been the first 
full year that Norges Bank has published its own interest-rate forecasts as part of its In-
flation Reports. This step has added to the transparency of Norwegian policy making, 
which is positive for building credibility for the inflation target. However, it also intro-
duces new risks in that it can uncover weaknesses that might exist in Norges Bank’s 
forecast activities. And its success would be threatened if substantial discrepancies be-
tween market expectations and the Bank’s forecasts should arise and persist over long 
periods. 
Our report is organized in four sections. Section 1 offers a conceptual discussion of 
the justifications and purposes of flexible inflation targeting. Section 2 surveys the per-
formance of Norwegian monetary policy in 2006, including Norges Bank’s communica-
tion of its policy. Section 3 reviews the needs for improvement that we perceive regard-
ing research and modeling, as well as the data needed for these purposes. Section 4 dis-
cusses Norges Bank’s mandate as well as other institutional issues in view of the pre-
ceding discussion. 
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1.  Inflation Targeting, Welfare, and Credibility: A Conceptual 
 Discussion 
The rationale for targeting inflation is rooted in both theory and practice.  It is mainly 
for practical reasons that inflation targeting has become the dominant strategy of mone-
tary policy around the world. It did so for three reasons: (i) failing to put a priority on 
price stability led to inexorably rising trend inflation and go-stop monetary policy that 
increased the volatility of both inflation and output, (ii) nearly a quarter century ago 
central bankers discovered that determined monetary policy could bring inflation down 
and stabilize it at a low rate, and (iii) since then low and stable inflation has been asso-
ciated with a great moderation in the volatility of output around the world.  Indirect 
strategies for stabilizing inflation involving either monetary targeting or a fixed nominal 
exchange rate to import low inflation from abroad had problems in practice that en-
couraged central banks to target inflation directly. 
Even though practical experience is the primary reason for the spread of inflation 
targeting, monetary theory played, and continues to play, an important supporting role. 
In the 1970s, monetary theorists helped to persuade central bankers that determined 
monetary policy could bring inflation down on a sustained basis with no permanent un-
employment cost. Since then, as a result of evidence accumulated in stabilizing inflation 
and revolutionary advances in academic modeling of the macro-economy, the theory of 
monetary policy has undergone a great transformation. The disarray then famously re-
flected in debates between monetarist and Keynesian economists has today been re-
solved in a consensus benchmark model of monetary policy referred to as the New Neo-
classical Synthesis or New Keynesian model, the two names reflecting the two direc-
tions from which the convergence came.  
Today, the theory of monetary policy continues to play an important role, in part, 
because it serves as a basis for discussions of policy among academic economists, mar-
ket participants, and central bankers. The benchmark consensus serves as a coherent 
framework for considering policy options inside central banks and provides a basis for 
communicating central bank concerns and intentions to the public. Moreover, because 
the benchmark model is consistent with practical experience across countries and over 
decades, it serves as a secure foundation for quantitative theoretical elaborations sure to 
improve our understanding of monetary policy and the performance of monetary policy 
in the future. We, however, employ the consensus benchmark for yet another purpose—
to provide a conceptual understanding of how inflation targeting works—as a basis for 
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our evaluation and assessment of the practical implementation of inflation targeting in 
Norway. 
Our conceptual overview of the New Neoclassical Synthesis (New Keynesian) 
model will address five issues that are particularly important for understanding inflation 
targeting in practice: the mechanics of inflation targeting, why inflation targeting is wel-
fare-maximizing monetary policy, the case for targeting “core” inflation, the role of 
credibility and transparency, and open-economy extensions of the benchmark model.1  
1.1  The Mechanics of Inflation Targeting 
At the heart of the model, output is produced by monopolistically competitive firms that 
set their product prices at a markup over the marginal cost of production. Because pric-
ing decisions are costly, firms consider changing their product prices only when demand 
or cost conditions are expected to compress or enlarge their markups significantly and 
persistently relative to their flexible-price profit-maximizing markups. For instance, 
firms may consider raising product prices if marginal cost moves above trend due to a 
productivity growth slowdown or if wage inflation accelerates due to a tightening of the 
labor market. To sustain the targeted rate of inflation, monetary policy influences ag-
gregate demand so as to offset the effect of such shocks on marginal cost, i.e., to keep 
marginal cost growing at the targeted rate of inflation. Then, firms will continue to raise 
product prices at the targeted rate of inflation, irrespective of such shocks, knowing that 
doing so will keep actual markups at profit-maximizing markups. 
If nominal wages are sufficiently flexible, then monetary policy can stabilize mar-
ginal cost fully by acting on wages alone through its influence on aggregate demand for 
goods and labor. This is more likely to be the case when stabilization merely requires 
nominal wages to rise faster or more slowly for a period of time. However, in some cir-
cumstances monetary policy might face a short-run tradeoff between inflation and un-
employment. For instance, if an outright fall in nominal wages is required to stabilize 
inflation, and nominal wages are temporarily rigid downward, then to stabilize inflation 
monetary policy must create an output gap and enough unemployment to drive upward 
the marginal physical product of labor in order to produce the required effect on mar-
                                                 
1 The exposition of the consensus benchmark model presented here has its origins in Goodfriend and 
King (1997, 2001) and in Goodfriend (2002).  See also Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999). Woodford 
(2003) explores monetary policy comprehensively in the benchmark model and in many of its elabora-
tions. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) is an early example of this modeling style.     
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ginal cost.2  In this case, a central bank must choose how much inflation to tradeoff in 
the short run to stabilize unemployment until the shock subsides and inflation can be 
brought back to target. This tradeoff lies at the heart of flexible inflation targeting. 
1.2  Why Inflation Targeting is Welfare-Maximizing Monetary Policy 
An economy in which monetary policy stabilizes inflation by sustaining profit-maxi-
mizing markups minimizes the need for sticky prices to be adjusted. Thus, it operates as 
if firms sustain profit-maximizing markups themselves by adjusting their own product 
prices flexibly.  Therefore, inflation targeting makes aggregate output fluctuate much 
like a flexible-price real business cycle—due to supply shocks to productivity, the terms 
of trade, or the labor force, etc. Inflation targeting is welfare-maximizing monetary pol-
icy because it neutralizes, as much as monetary policy can, macroeconomic distortions 
due to costly price adjustment and yields the most efficient cyclical stabilization of em-
ployment and output that monetary policy can deliver. 
It is worth emphasizing that the consensus model employs real business cycle rea-
soning in a very different way than was initially proposed. Real business cycle models 
were introduced originally in the early 1980s to explore fluctuations in employment and 
output in models in which prices and wages are perfectly flexible. Business cycles are 
optimal in such models and monetary policy plays little if any role in the determination 
of employment and output.  In other words, real business cycle models were proposed 
as an alternative to monetary policy models of aggregate fluctuations. Nevertheless, an 
important insight of the New Neoclassical Synthesis (New Keynesian) consensus is that 
real business cycle models play a central normative role in monetary policy analysis.  If 
the effects of frictions are removed, then the result is an economy that actually works 
like a real business cycle model, and the optimality argument makes sense.  The con-
sensus does not argue that all cycles are good, but that monetary policy should make 
sure that the good cycles are the only ones allowed to occur, and they should be allowed 
to occur fully. 
1.3  The Case for Targeting Core Inflation 
Some prices are typically more flexible than others. In many countries, the prices of 
goods such as food and energy are highly flexible. In the case of Norway, food may not 
be a good example, but energy is; and other prices, such as air fares, could be added as a 
                                                 
2 Wage rigidity has been analyzed in this context by Erceg, Henderson, and Levin  (2000), Huang and Liu 
(2002), Blanchard and Galí (2005) and others. 
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result of deregulation. So the question arises, should targeted inflation include flexible 
as well as sticky prices, or should a core measure of sticky-price inflation be targeted? 
The above reasoning suggests that monetary policy should target the measure of infla-
tion that allows the economy to operate as much like a flexible-price economy as possi-
ble. Targeting a core index of sticky-price inflation does this.  Core inflation targeting 
makes the sticky-price sector operate as if prices were flexible there and allows prices in 
the flexible-price sector to adjust freely relative to core prices.  
In practice, it may be difficult to determine which prices are mostly sticky and which 
are mostly flexible. As a rule, it would seem less costly to leave a sticky price out of the 
core index than to include a flexible one because, whenever this flexible price changes, 
the latter policy then imposes countervailing changes in the prices where such changes 
are costly. 
1.4  The Role of Credibility and Transparency 
Credibility for low inflation is central to the efficient operation of inflation targeting. 
This is so because firms care about expected future marginal cost in setting current 
prices. If a central bank has credibility, then on average firms will expect monetary pol-
icy to ensure that departures of actual from profit-maximizing markups will be tem-
porary.  Hence, credibility anchors inflation to the target by insulating inflation from 
current and expected future shocks.  
In contrast, the absence of credibility makes expectations of future marginal cost ex-
cessively sensitive to shocks, exposing a central bank to inflation scares. Inflation scares 
are easy to understand from the perspective of the benchmark model: monetary policy 
has the power to stimulate aggregate demand in the short run, which firms are happy to 
accommodate by hiring more labor.  Thus, the public understands that a central bank 
has an incentive to cheat on its commitment to price stability to increase employment. 
The model emphasizes, however, that such monetary stimulus will precipitate higher 
wages, compress markups, and prompt firms to raise prices to restore their profit-
maximizing markups, ultimately neutralizing the effect of monetary stimulus on em-
ployment and output. 
To secure the credibility of a central bank’s commitment to low inflation, it is a 
good idea for inflation targeting to have strong institutional support. A central bank 
should have the operational independence to use its interest rate policy instrument flexi-
bly and aggressively if need be to stabilize inflation. A central bank should have the 
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support of a legislative mandate directing it to target inflation. A central bank should be 
held accountable by the government for targeting inflation. 
A central bank should also use transparency to help secure the credibility of its infla-
tion target. Monetary policy geared to targeting low inflation is demanding, not only of 
institutions, but also of the competence of a central bank to manage interest rate policy 
to sustain low inflation. Transparency of institutional arrangements and of a central 
bank’s understanding of the state of the economy, the channels of monetary transmis-
sion, and its medium-term objectives with respect to inflation and unemployment rein-
force the public’s confidence in a central bank’s commitment and competence to sustain 
targeted inflation, and thereby enhances the efficiency with which monetary policy can 
achieve its objectives.  
Transparency can be counterproductive if it exposes the fact that a central bank has 
inconsistent objectives, hidden or otherwise, or incoherence in its internal analysis of 
monetary policy.  On the other hand, limited transparency with regard to institutions or 
operations exposes the central bank to shocks to the credibility of its commitment to 
low inflation. A central bank should resolve such tensions so that it can make efficient 
use of transparency to secure the credibility of its inflation target. 
With regard to monetary policy operations, it is worth emphasizing that inflation 
targeting needs structural models, forecasting models, and reliable macroeconomic 
data—to evaluate quantitatively the state of the economy, to indicate inflationary forces 
that policy has to offset, and to determine the interest rate policy actions needed to do 
the job. Given the spread of inflation targeting around the world, there is a growing 
community of monetary economists and central bankers with modeling experience to 
draw on. Central bank economists must continually adapt the latest modeling techniques 
to their own national circumstances in order to build models best suited to support 
monetary policy in their respective countries.  
A central bank must make sure that it has available sufficiently comprehensive and 
reliable macroeconomic data to support inflation targeting. In particular, a central bank 
must give careful consideration to the construction of the core price index to target, in 
part because the boundary between sticky and flexible prices is a matter of judgment in 
practice. A central bank can utilize profitably a variety of measures of inflation other 
than the core index it chooses to target in order to help judge inflation or deflation pres-
sures and act against them. In addition, a central bank should utilize a variety of goods 
and labor market indicators of inflation pressure (such as price-cost markups relative to 
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their historical average, time series on unit labor costs, measures of the output gap, and 
estimates of unemployment relative to the natural rate) to enable interest rate policy ac-
tions to be taken preemptively against deviations of inflation from the target. 
1.5  Open-Economy Extensions of the Benchmark Model 
The closed-economy benchmark consensus model is a useful starting-point for thinking 
about inflation targeting. However, to provide specific conceptual guidance for our re-
port on Norwegian monetary policy, we consider a small open economy extension of 
the benchmark model.  In addition to a monopolistically competitive sector that pro-
duces goods for domestic consumption, it supposes that the economy has an export sec-
tor that sells its output at a foreign-currency price given in world markets. It furthermore 
supposes that the economy imports a share of consumption goods at a foreign-currency 
price also given in world markets.  The economy has a floating foreign exchange rate. 
The principles outlined above suggest that monetary policy in the small open econ-
omy should target a core index of domestic-currency denominated prices of goods and 
services produced for domestic use by monopolistically competitive firms. Core in-
flation should be stabilized subject to a potential short-run tradeoff between inflation 
and unemployment due to nominal wage rigidity as discussed above. Export and import 
prices would then be free to adjust relative to targeted core domestic-currency prices of 
non-traded goods. The domestic currency prices of exports and imports would fluctuate 
partly due to movements in the foreign-currency price of exports and imports, and 
partly with respect to fluctuations in the foreign exchange rate. 
In practice, one can make a case for including import prices in the targeted inflation 
index. To the extent that the domestic value added of imports is a significant part of 
cost, there is scope for monetary policy to influence import costs through its pressure on 
domestic resource utilization. A price index that excludes imports furthermore might be 
deemed too narrow to serve as a reliable, credible inflation target. The problem is exac-
erbated if, as is the case in Norway, some prices are administered or a significant por-
tion of non-traded goods and services are provided by government without explicit 
prices. Moreover, empirical evidence from many countries has indicated that importers 
to a large extent do not pass cost adjustments through to their customers, but instead 
“price to market.” 
With respect to this argument, however, we would emphasize that it would be ex-
ceedingly difficult in practice for a central bank to control the marginal cost of imports 
at the border because that would almost amount to controlling the exchange rate. Fur-
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thermore, our remarks in Section 1.3 suggest that it would be more of a problem to in-
clude import prices in the core index if they indeed are flexible than to exclude them if 
they are sticky. 
In any case, for inflation targeting to work well, the central bank must allow the for-
eign exchange rate to float freely so that interest rate policy is not constrained by an ex-
plicit or a hidden commitment to stabilize the exchange rate. Interest rate policy must 
have the independence and the flexibility to act aggressively as needed, irrespective of 
the foreign exchange rate, to sustain targeted core inflation. Moreover, interest rate pol-
icy must be believed by the markets to have that flexibility so that current interest rate 
policy actions can exert maximum leverage over expected future short-term interest 
rates (and long-term interest rates) with a minimum of short-term interest rate volatility. 
Otherwise, the credibility of the inflation target may be compromised, and with it the 
efficiency of monetary policy itself.  
We emphasize that the full flexibility of the exchange rate is not a goal in itself, but 
a necessary prerequisite for monetary policy to help the real economy function effi-
ciently. Therefore, even though monetary policy should not react directly to exchange 
rate movements, policy must take account of the indirect effects that shocks and policy 
actions themselves have on targeted core inflation, in part, through their effect on the 
foreign exchange rate. Shocks to the terms of trade and other international factors play 
an especially important role in a small open economy. Nevertheless, the fundamental 
principle of monetary policy carries over from the benchmark closed-economy model: 
the flexible targeting of core inflation, with the help of international factors to judge 
cost pressures in the non-traded, sticky price sector, delivers welfare-maximizing mone-
tary policy.  
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2.  Monetary Policy Performance in 2006 
Norges Bank held nine policy meetings during 2006. At three of these meetings, in 
March, June, and November, new Inflation Reports were released. As shown in Table 
2.1, five of the meetings tightened policy, each time raising the policy rate by 25 basis 
points, whereas the remaining four meetings left the policy rate unchanged. During 
most of the year, the tightening clearly was done “in small and not too frequent steps,” 
as frequently expressed by the Bank. In hindsight, this clearly meant tightening at every 
other meeting, which represented a slight quickening from 2005. The pace seems to 
have quickened further towards the end of 2006, with tightening at two consecutive 
meetings. A forewarning of this quickening could be read from the upward revision of 
the Bank’s interest-rate forecasts between the March and June meetings and Inflation 
Reports. An even stronger signal came with the more substantial upward revision of the 
interest-rate forecast in November. 
 
Table 2.1: Policy meetings in 2006 
Inflation Policy rate
Date Report? change 4 qtrs ahead 8 qtrs ahead 12 qtrs ahead
Jan 25 No None
Mar 16 Yes + 25 bp 10 -2 n.a.
Apr 26 No None
May 31 No + 25 bp
Jun 29 Yes None 28 34 33
Aug 16 No + 25 bp
Sep 27 No None
Nov 1 Yes +25 bp 50 54 21
Dec 13 No +25 bp
Rate forecast changes (basis points)
 
Source: Norges Bank 
 
As a matter of principle, we would have liked to assess these individual policy deci-
sions. In fact, our mandate can be said to ask for it. To do this meaningfully, however, 
we would have needed access to the full ex ante information on which Norges Bank 
based its decisions when they were made. We discuss the need for such information fur-
ther in Section 2.4 below. In its absence, we have chosen to focus instead on our general 
understanding of the challenges facing Norwegian monetary policy this year. Based on 
what we have been able to ascertain, we feel Norges Bank has shown a good grasp of 
the issues at hand and has made reasonable choices. We also feel that some of the exter-
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nal criticism has been misplaced in that it has paid insufficient attention to some of the 
recent positive supply shocks that we consider below. Moreover, we feel the debate has 
uncovered some important issues whose interest stretches well beyond the Norwegian 
borders. We will discuss three such issues, namely, the apparent dilemma for monetary 
policy in 2006, possible structural changes, and Norges Bank’s communication of its 
policy during this year. 
2.1  Dilemma or Not? 
Even as exceptionally strong real growth has continued this year, underlying inflation 
(as measured by the CPI-ATE) has remained well below the 2.5% target. Headline in-
flation has been higher, but apparently temporarily as the result of a spike in electricity 
prices following the summer drought. At the same time, the real economy has been 
booming, as evidenced by high growth and low and falling unemployment. Thus, Nor-
ges Bank would seem to have faced a classical dilemma for monetary policy as the low 
inflation should call for easing and the boom for tightening. 
Current macroeconomic developments are always difficult to judge. Therefore, we 
are not surprised to have found a range of opinions in our conversations with various 
observers. Our own view tends to focus on the string of positive supply shocks that ap-
pear to have affected the Norwegian economy in recent years, such as the entrance of 
new, low-cost producers in the global economy, the rise in oil prices, increases in labor 
supply, and important productivity improvements in certain sectors. We believe these 
shocks have raised potential GDP even as they have changed equilibrium relative 
prices. This kind of environment may introduce tradeoffs between keeping inflation at 
the target on the one hand and effectively utilizing the economy’s potential on the 
other.3 As noted in Section 1.1, wage stickiness may add to the tradeoff. Furthermore, 
positive supply shocks tend to reduce the economy’s natural rate of interest; in other 
words, monetary policy needs to turn expansionary to make sure that the economy’s po-
tential is utilized in full.4 This is particularly true in the early part of such a period as the 
positive nature of the shocks have not become apparent to all agents. As time passes, 
however, tightening is needed if people start to take temporary improvements for 
granted as permanent blessings. 
                                                 
3 Woodford (2003), pp. 200–204. 
4 Positive supply shocks raise aggregate demand, but by less than the improvement in current potential 
output because households tend to smooth consumption gains over time. Thus, the real interest rate needs 
to decline for supply and demand to match. See, for example, Woodford (2003), p. 80. 
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Thus, although the details can be discussed, the monetary easing of recent years 
seems to us generally appropriate, as does the current tightening. However, several of 
our discussion partners pointed out some risks to the gradual approach that Norges Bank 
so far has taken: 
• The resulting labor market tightening may raise inflation down the road, per-
haps requiring a sharp policy reversal. In our view, this may be the greatest 
risk at the present time. Norges Bank seems to share this view as well, as 
evidenced by its actions and public statements in late 2006 and early 2007.5 
• Real investments undertaken in an environment of low interest rates could 
prove excessive and unprofitable once rates normalize, so that the current 
boom could bear the seeds of a subsequent recession. 
• Unrealistic expectations that ultra-low interest rates have come to stay may 
have caused firms or households to borrow excessively, thus raising the risk 
of future financial instability. 
Although we feel somewhat uncertain about the importance of the two latter risks, 
we suspect that the risks in general could have been mitigated if the inflation target had 
been expressed in terms of the inflation rate of domestically produced non-energy goods 
rather than the broader CPI or even CPI-ATE, as this would have implied a less expan-
sionary monetary policy. Thus, the suggestion we make in Section 1.5 above bears di-
rect relevance to the Norwegian situation from 2003 on. On the other hand, we empha-
size that the choice of inflation index to use as a target should not be changed in re-
sponse to individual shocks to the economy, but on general grounds as discussed in Sec-
tion 1. We will return to this issue in Section 4. 
We furthermore add that the risk of financial instability may have been driven less 
by the extent of the 2003–2005 easing than by the length of time that the policy rate was 
left unchanged at 1.75%. Such an extended period of unchanged interest rates risks 
leaving an impression that any future change is unlikely. It might have been preferable 
to cut the policy rate more radically in 2004, but for a shorter period than was actually 
done.  
                                                 
5 See, for example, the press releases accompanying the December 2006 and January 2007 rate hikes, 
http://www.norges-bank.no/front/pressemelding/en/2006/2006-12-13T12-56-20.fgen.html, and 
http://www.norges-bank.no/front/pressemelding/en/2007/2007-01-24T12-25-37.fgen.html. 
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2.2  More on the Shocks 
The many shocks that appear to have hit the Norwegian economy in recent years are not 
entirely observable, so to some extent we are left guessing at what actually has hap-
pened. However, we feel we reasonably can identify four different shocks: 
1. Starting in the late 1990s, the relative prices of a number of imported consumer 
goods have dropped. This decline is naturally related to the emergence of new 
global competitors, such as China, India, and Eastern Europe and is sometimes 
referred to as the “China I” effect. This effect has been particularly strong for 
Norway because, as a non-EU member, Norway liberalized its trade with these 
competitors at an earlier stage than the EU members or, for that matter, the 
United States. This terms-of-trade shock has expanded the overall purchasing 
power of Norwegian consumers; but it has also implied substantial changes in 
relative prices between the relevant imports and other goods and services. As 
noted in Section 1 above, such idiosyncratic shocks can imply tradeoffs in 
monetary policy. However, we note again that the tradeoff perhaps could have 
been made easier if the price index for domestically-produced goods and ser-
vices had been used as the inflation target. 
 
2. While moderating somewhat recently, oil prices have risen significantly, with 
nominal dollar prices doubling since the beginning of 2003. Emerging-economy 
demand has been important for this rise, which has earned it the label “China II” 
for the case of Norway. A slower than expected expansion of global production 
capacity has added to the price pressures.6 Oil production has proved lower than 
expected on the Norwegian shelf as well7; but natural-gas production is rising 
rapidly, and the price increase has much more than made up for the modest oil 
volume decline. 
 
This shock is also a terms-of-trade shock, benefiting the population at large as 
recipients of oil revenues. But at the same time it is an idiosyncratic shock in 
that it has greatly improved profitability in the oil and gas sector. Furthermore, 
                                                 
6 Exploration has yielded fewer and smaller finds than expected, bringing new fields on line has proved 
slower than usual, and keeping up production in mature fields has proved demanding. 
7 For example, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate recently revised down by 400,000 barrels per day its 
forecast of 2007 production of crude oil and other liquids. See  
http://www.npd.no/English/Emner/Ressursforvaltning/Utbygging_og_drift/5.1.2007+sokkelåret+2006+-
+petroleumsproduksjon.htm. 
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as oil and gas production requires domestic labor, it puts pressure on the labor 
market. And the demand for domestic labor has increased further as the higher 
oil revenues have raised private and public demand for non-traded goods and 
services. This increase in labor demand would seem to warrant real wage in-
creases over and above the growth in productivity. Part of the nominal wage 
growth that has been observed in the second half of 2006 may thus have been of 
this variety. However, we are quite open to the notion that part of it also may be 
inflationary as agents fail to realize the effective limits to potential growth. 
Separating out these effects has been a real challenge for Norwegian monetary 
policy in 2006. 
 
3. The supply of labor seems to have expanded greatly for two reasons, one inter-
nal, and one external. The internal source was a rule change that cut sick leave 
by about 2.5% of the labor force from the middle of 2004. There has been a 
slight subsequent increase, but not a significant one. The external source is an 
influx of guest workers, mainly from the new EU members. The magnitude is a 
matter of some debate.8 The government’s issuance of work permits serves as 
the most important statistical source. However, it is perfectly legal for foreigners 
to work in Norway without a permit, for example, if they are residents of an-
other Nordic country or if they are employed by a foreign company from within 
the EU delivering services in Norway. Subcontractors to Norwegian construc-
tion firms are an obvious example. In fact, it is commonly believed that a num-
ber of guest workers offer their services as one-man firms. Casual observation 
suggests that the total numbers could be large. We believe they significantly ex-
ceed the effects of the reduction in sick leave. However, although migration 
seems to have increased in general, both within Europe and on a global scale,9 
we would find it unlikely that migration should continue to raise Norwegian la-
bor supply at the same rate as recently. A gradual slowdown seems more likely, 
and a reversal cannot be excluded.10 
 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Søvik and Mork (2006) for a discussion of the available data. 
9 This is described, for example, in a United Nations report (2006). 
10 A further surge in the domestic labor force in late 2006 appears to have been endogenously driven, i.e. 
by the labour-market tightness itself. We thus do not classify this as a supply shock. 
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A positive labor-supply shock unambiguously raises potential output. Thus, 
when output is expanded with the use of this additional labor, inflationary pres-
sures should not arise, nor should there be a need for monetary tightening. How-
ever, as noted in Section 3 below, even Norges Bank has difficulty ascertaining 
the actual effect that this shock has had on potential GDP. Thus, we consider it 
plausible that private agents may find the situation even harder to judge; in par-
ticular, we suspect that optimism regarding future immigration easily can be ex-
aggerated. If our reasoning is right, Norges Bank’s policy of early easing fol-
lowed by subsequent tightening should not be far off the mark. 
 
4. Important productivity improvements have taken place in key sectors of the Nor-
wegian economy. A major reorganization of the retail industry took place in par-
allel with the influx of cheap imports from emerging economies and seems to 
have exacerbated its effects. Advances in telecommunications and the structural 
changes in the airline industry have occurred in Norway on similar scales as in 
other countries. Here, again, we believe we observe idiosyncratic supply-shocks 
that raise similar challenges for monetary policy as the new influx of low-cost 
imports. 
2.3  Structural Change in Wage-Price Dynamics? 
In Norway, as in other economies, the labor market serves as an important channel for 
the transmission of aggregate demand pressures into consumer inflation. This mecha-
nism has always been somewhat sluggish, but we suspect that recent changes have 
made it even more so. 
The traditional sluggishness can perhaps be traced to the institutional structure of the 
Norwegian labor market. Central wage negotiations normally take place only annually, 
with complete contract negotiations in even-numbered years and intermediate adjust-
ments in odd-numbered years. If these agreements conflict significantly with the forces 
of supply and demand, wage drift typically acts as a corrective force, at least partially, 
and in the upward direction. However, wage drift does not seem to be equally effective 
in all sectors—public-sector and hotel employees are often mentioned as exceptions. 
These groups then seek to catch up with wage drift elsewhere in subsequent centralized 
talks, which typically take place several months, maybe over a year, after the wage drift 
has taken place. 
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The recent inflow of guest workers appears to have served as an additional buffer in 
the labor market and is widely credited with the remarkably slow wage growth in 
2005.11 We hesitate to refer to this additional delay as a separate structural change, how-
ever. Instead, we note a gradual change that has taken place over a number of years, 
namely, that a steadily declining share of the Norwegian labor force is engaged in the 
production of consumer goods and services for the domestic market. Industry is increas-
ingly oriented towards oil and gas and other export sectors, as is much of the business-
service sector. Domestic service production is certainly important; but most of these 
services are produced in the public sector and made available free of charge or at prices 
that cover only small fractions of the cost, with only a marginal effect on CPI inflation. 
This is the case for most of education, all but a small part of health care, and all of long-
term nursing care. The other side of this coin is that a steadily increasing share of the 
goods and services that Norwegian consumers buy in the market are imported from 
abroad. This looks like a structural change that weakens the traditional link between la-
bor costs and consumer prices. 
This is not to say that wage inflation in the public sector has no influence on con-
sumer-price inflation. However, it probably means that the mechanism is slower and 
more circumscribed. For example, public-sector wage increases translate into higher 
demand by public-sector workers for goods and services sold in the market, thus even-
tually driving up their prices via higher markups or private-sector wage increases. 
We believe the drawn-out nature of this process serves as an additional argument in 
for the gradual approach taken by Norges Bank to monetary tightening in 2006. How-
ever, this gradualism also carries a risk of creating an illusion that wage inflation can be 
ignored altogether. It is thus important that it not be carried too far. 
2.4 Communication of Policy 
Previous Norges Bank Watch groups have commended Norges Bank for the way it 
communicates its decisions and analysis. An important addition this year is the publica-
tion of the Bank’s own interest-rate forecast, on which we will comment more in Sec-
tion 4 below. 
While we feel the commendations by earlier Norges Bank Watch groups have been 
well deserved, we also feel that something is missing from the information we get from 
Norges Bank, namely the ex ante information needed to undertake the kind of evalua-
                                                 
11 For example, Teknisk Beregningsutvalg (2006), Table 5.8. 
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tion we have been asked to make, i.e., the actual basis that Norges Bank used to reach 
its policy conclusions. Although the facts and considerations mentioned in the Bank’s 
press releases fulfill part of this need, we miss a clearer exposition of the role and ex-
planation of the Bank’s use of models of various kinds in arriving at its assessment of 
current circumstances as well as the proper policy stance. We also miss the quantitative 
reasoning behind judgments made to amend or override the models. Although we agree 
with earlier Norges Bank Watch groups about the value of publishing the Strategy 
Notes as part of the Inflation Report, we do not feel this quite meets the need that we 
perceive. 
Moreover, we miss a record of the discussion that has preceded the decisions. There 
are always two sides to a monetary policy decision. That is in the nature of the use of 
judgment, and no central bank should try to hide this point. In fact, we believe Norges 
Bank would benefit from the expanded debate with the government and other parties 
that could occur had this information been available. This kind of debate should be wel-
comed because it would either help persuade markets and the public of the appropriate-
ness of the Bank’s policy stance or help to improve policy over time and thus secure its 
credibility. 
Making such information available would require minutes to be released from the 
policy meetings and would work best if all the members of the Board commented on 
monetary policy in public. We return to these institutional issues in Section 4. For now, 
we note a somewhat different—perhaps even contrasting—point. Even as we ask for 
more information than the Bank now makes available, we see a risk of information 
overload for some users, particularly those in financial markets. They often need to 
make quick decisions based on announcements of changes in the policy stance. Their 
need is thus to get the gist of the relevant information in a more succinct form. For their 
benefit, as well as that of the media, we recommend a brief summary at the beginning of 
each Inflation Report. The press releases, although certainly shorter, suffer from some 
of the same problems. Shorter releases, focusing only on the decisive issues, would be 
worth considering. A further improvement would be obtained by having the inflation 
reports relate the reasoning underlying the Board’s decisions more closely to the Bank’s 
models and judgment. 
Lastly, we note the risk of misunderstanding involved in connection with the re-
peated use of special phrases describing current policy, such as “small and not too fre-
quent steps” or “it is unlikely that rates will be raised at every monetary policy meet-
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ing.” Such phrases frequently are interpreted as containing more exact information than 
intended. Readers, especially in financial markets, devote considerable energy to deci-
phering this information. Thus, in press conferences, Norges Bank has repeatedly been 
asked if so-and-so future decision could be consistent with such-and-such phrase.12 Per-
haps the greatest risk is that market participants will read the omission of such a phrase 
as a major change in the Bank’s policy stance when it is not intended. We furthermore 
feel the publication of the Bank’s own interest rate forecast greatly reduces the need for 
such phrases. We thus recommend that they be used sparingly. 
 
                                                 
12 See, for example, the press conference on December 13, 2006,  
http://www.norges-bank.no/english/press/conferences/charts2006.html, or on January 24, 2007, 
http://www.norges-bank.no/english/press/conferences/. 
Norges Bank Watch 2007  32 
 
3.  Analysis and Measurement 
To enhance credibility, it is important to convince private agents that decisions are 
based on competent analysis of relevant data. As mentioned in Section 1, inflation tar-
geting is demanding in terms of data and analysis. In this section we therefore review 
some issues related to analysis and measurement at Norges Bank: (i) the need for basic 
research, (ii) forecasting and judgment, and (iii) the need for statistical data to carry out 
these efforts. We defer the discussion of interest rate forecasts to Section 4. 
3.1  Need for Basic Research 
Norges Bank has made great strides in recent years building up a research-based model 
apparatus. The Bank’s research department participates actively in the international re-
search community. Our review suggests that the following two areas should be impor-
tant in future research. 
First, because Norway is a rather small and extremely open economy, research on 
monetary policy in an open economy should receive special emphasis. As noted in Sec-
tion 1.5, the benchmark model for monetary analysis was initially and most extensively 
developed for a closed economy. Open-economy extensions have certainly been made.13 
These extensions rely on important assumptions regarding key mechanisms, such as ex-
change-rate movements and the pricing of imported goods. Norges Bank should aim for 
a thoroughly tested, structural specification of the openness features of the Norwegian 
economy. A welcome addition in this respect is the Norwegian Economy Model 
(NEMO) currently being developed at the Bank.14 This is an open-economy extension 
of the benchmark model discussed in Section 1, adapted to the Norwegian Economy.  
Second, we would like to see some empirical research on wage and price stickiness 
and flexibility in Norway. As indicated in Section 1.3, such findings should provide in-
formation on which prices need to be included in the index targeted by monetary policy. 
Some well-known findings have been obtained from U.S. data.15 However, we see sev-
eral reasons to expect Norwegian wage and price setting to be different. For example, 
agricultural regulations make it likely that food prices are adjusted less frequently; and 
the high degree of unionization and legislative union protection makes us expect sig-
                                                 
13 See, for instance, McCallum and Nelson (2000), Benigno and Benigno (2003), Corsetti and Pesenti 
(2004), or Galí and Monacelli (2005). 
14 See Brubakk, Husebø, Maih, Olsen, and Østnor (2006). 
15 See the survey by Taylor (1999). A more recent example is the study by Bils and Klenow (2004). 
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nificant differences in wage setting. Research on Norwegian data should therefore add 
significant value. 
3.2  Forecasting and Judgment 
Because monetary policy under inflation targeting is forward looking, it needs to be 
based on forecasts of how the course of the economy is likely to evolve in the future, 
including the effects of monetary policy changes. Good forecasts require good models 
as well as good judgment. The core forecasting model at Norges Bank is a four-equation 
open-economy model similar to models in the New Neoclassical Synthesis (New 
Keynesian) tradition, albeit without complete microfoundations.16 Such a “structural” 
model is necessary to construct the conditional forecasts needed for monetary policy, 
for example, projections of the interest rate path that is required to bring inflation back 
to target within a reasonable time horizon. That is, the model ensures that the forecasts 
of inflation, the output gap, the interest rate, and the exchange rate are internally consis-
tent, and that they are consistent with an “optimal” monetary policy. However, struc-
tural models do not always forecast well compared with pure forecasting models that 
are less constrained by economic theory. We would therefore recommend that these 
conditional forecasts (including the estimated confidence intervals) are compared with 
and supplemented by forecasts from pure forecasting models, such as Vector Auto-
Regression (VAR) models or dynamic factor models, as discussed further below. When 
such models forecast better, Norges Bank should seek to decipher which features cause 
their superiority and, to the extent possible, include these features in the structural mod-
els. It is unclear to us what attention is currently given to such models in the forecasting 
procedure at Norges Bank. 
Furthermore, the core model seems to ignore some potentially important features of 
the Norwegian economy:  
• The exchange-rate forecast rests on the assumption of uncovered interest 
parity, an assumption that has very weak empirical support generally, not 
just for Norway.  
• The model incorporates inflation in the import sector in a rather rudimentary 
fashion, so that the effects of foreign shocks are unlikely to be very well cap-
                                                 
16 The general forecasting procedures are discussed briefly in Kloster and Solberg-Johansen (2006), and 
the core forecasting model is presented in Husebø, McCaw, Olsen, and Røisland (2004). Only minor ad-
justments to the model specification have been made since then. 
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tured. For example, the model has been unable to foresee the negative impact 
on inflation in the import sector. 
• The model implicitly assumes a frictionless, atomistic labor market, while 
the Norwegian labor market is characterized by highly centralized wage 
formation, as mentioned above. 
• There is no role for credit market frictions or asset prices.  
These issues would be important to develop when building a model that could better re-
flect the current state of the Norwegian economy and its implications for monetary pol-
icy. While the NEMO model develops some of these issues, it is difficult (and often in-
feasible) to capture all relevant features in one particular model. Therefore we would 
recommend the Bank to use several alternative models, both structural and reduced-
form models, to obtain more robust forecasts and policy advice. 
Inflation Forecasts 
Norges Bank focuses on forecasts for CPI-ATE inflation, that is, CPI inflation adjusted 
for tax changes and excluding energy products. In recent years, there has been a strong 
tendency for CPI-ATE inflation to turn out lower than Norges Bank’s forecasts. Figure 
3.1 examines these forecasts as published in Inflation Reports 1/04 to 3/06. The figure 
shows the forecast of CPI-ATE inflation one to four quarters ahead with 90% confi-
dence intervals, along with the realized path of CPI-ATE inflation.17 Here, the mode 
forecasts (the thin solid lines) are almost always above the actual inflation rate (the thick 
solid lines). This in itself is not surprising, as the recent years have been characterized 
by unexpectedly low inflationary pressure from the import sector, and other central 
banks (for example, Sveriges Riksbank) have also consistently over-predicted inflation. 
However, Figure 3.1 also suggests that the Bank has consistently under-estimated the 
uncertainty surrounding the forecasts: the actual inflation rate has fallen outside the es-
timated 90% confidence intervals much more often than 10% of the time. 
There could of course be many reasons why the Bank’s forecasting model over-
predicts the inflation level and under-predicts inflation uncertainty. To some extent it 
could be due to the small sample that is available for estimating the model and the seri-
ally correlated nature of price import shocks that we have seen recently. Thus, we sus-
pect that forecasts of the inflation rate for domestically produced non-energy goods and 
services, if undertaken, would have looked better. Nevertheless, an important issue is 
                                                 
17 As the inflation report is published only three times a year but the forecasts are at a quarterly frequency, 
three forecasts in each panel have a horizon one quarter longer than the remaining forecasts. 
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whether the Bank could have done better forecasting the CPI-ATE in real time. Nymoen 
(2005) argues that his “automatized” inflation forecasts outperform those of the Norges 
Bank in forecast precision and also imply wider confidence intervals. While Nymoen’s 
model is not structural, and therefore cannot be used to construct the conditional fore-
casts needed for monetary policy, it might give some indication of where the Bank’s 
model goes wrong.  
 
Figure 3.1: CPI-ATE inflation and Norges Bank forecasts at different horizons 
with 90% confidence bands 
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Source: Norges Bank Inflation Report, various issues 
 
Exchange-Rate Forecasts 
We certainly appreciate the difficulties involved in forecasting exchange rates.18 How-
ever, the emphasis that Norges Bank puts on its verbal communication on the exchange 
rate as a transmission mechanism for monetary policy calls for a solidly based specifica-
tion of the link between interest rates and exchange rates. For a small open economy, 
this emphasis seems well placed. The experience of 2002–2003 certainly points in this 
direction, see Figure 3.2. During this period, monetary tightening led to a sizeable as 
well as protracted krone appreciation, as the figure shows. 
 
                                                 
18 See, for example, the survey by Harrison and Mogford (2004).  
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Figure 3.2: Exchange rate and interest-rate differential
Source: Reuters EcoWin
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Yet, in Inflation Report 3/06, Norges Bank’s forecast of the import-weighted ex-
change rate is essentially a horizontal line, at a level that is actually a little weaker than 
in 2006Q3. This forecast is especially puzzling considering that Norges Bank predicts 
Norwegian interest rates to rise faster than the weighted average of the corresponding 
rates of the trading partners. Figure 3.3 shows the interest-rate differential and ex-
change-rate paths and forecasts reported in Inflation Report 3/06.19 In 2004–2006 the 
average interest-rate differential was –47 basis points, while the exchange rate depreci-
ated by around six per cent. For 2007–2009, Norges Bank forecasts (in the baseline sce-
nario) a shift to a large positive interest-rate differential, but without any sizable effects 
on the exchange rate. 
 
Figure 3.3: Trade-weighted nominal exchange rate and interest-rate differential 
relative to trading partners. Quarterly averages 
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Source: Norges Bank Inflation Report 3/06 
 
                                                 
19 The forecast for trading partners’ interest rates is based on implicit market expectations with a slight 
adjustment based on judgment. 
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Norges Bank’s exchange-rate forecast is based on a specification of uncovered inter-
est parity (UIP), supplemented by judgment.20 The textbook UIP specification predicts 
that a higher interest rate in Norway than the average of those of the trading partners 
leads to an abrupt krone appreciation and an expected gradual depreciation so that in-
vestors in foreign currencies are compensated for the relative loss that they otherwise 
would have suffered from the difference in interest rates. Compared to the 2002–2003 
experience (see again Figure 3.2), this prediction implies a much smaller exchange-rate 
movement and, after the initial appreciation, in the opposite direction of the protracted 
appreciation during that period. This discrepancy between UIP-based predictions and 
available data is hardly surprising in view of the work by Fama (1984) and many others 
on the so-called forward premium puzzle. This gives good reason for Norges Bank to 
use judgment to supplement the UIP benchmark. 
However, we feel Norges Bank could be more forthcoming about its use of judg-
ment. On the one hand, we are certainly well aware that judgment is a critical compo-
nent of monetary policy making. While formal models are useful—indeed indispensa-
ble—tools in the policy-making process, they are by their very nature abstract and may 
thus omit factors that turn up as important at any given time. Therefore, the models need 
to be amended or overridden frequently to take account of such factors. That is the art of 
monetary policy. However, central banks should convey and explain the reasoning be-
hind their judgments. Precisely because judgment is this important it is critical for 
transparency that a central bank clearly explain, in quantitative terms, the reasoning be-
hind the non-model-based judgment calls that lie behind its decisions. 
Output Gap 
Given Norges Bank’s objective of flexible inflation targeting, forecasts of the output 
gap—and thus of potential output in addition to actual output—are almost as important 
as the inflation forecasts. The output gap forecasts published in the Inflation Report are 
generated by the core model, again supplemented by judgment. However, this model 
does not include a measure of potential output, nor of the uncertainty surrounding such 
measures, and Norges Bank does not publish any precise forecasts of either actual or 
potential output. Table 5 in Annex II of the Inflation Reports (on the very last page) 
shows that potential output is assumed to grow by 2.5 per cent each year from 2005 to 
                                                 
20 An exposition of Norges Bank’s approach has been given by Bergo (2006). Bernhardsen and Holmsen 
(2005) discuss some alternative exchange rate assumptions for economic modelling, while Qvigstad 
(2005) discusses the implications for Norwegian monetary policy. 
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2009, suggesting that potential output is a log-linear trend. As mentioned earlier and 
discussed in more detail below, there are reasons to be skeptical about such trend meas-
ures of potential output. Also, while we appreciate the difficulties in measuring and 
forecasting potential output, the conceptual discussion in Section 1 suggests that such 
measures of inflationary pressure can be useful to reduce the measurement errors and 
improve on the forecasts. 
In general, greater openness about the methods used would help fostering a climate 
of constructive discussion within the Bank as well as with outside analysts. We fur-
thermore doubt that one method can be deemed superior to all others, so that reasonable 
forecasts should be based on a set of different methods. 
3.3  Measurement and Data 
Flexible inflation targeting is quite demanding in terms of economic data. Although 
Norway has a long and distinguished tradition of economic data production, we see im-
portant needs for improvement. 
Output Gap Again 
Again, we focus first on potential output and the output gap. The discussion of the 
benchmark model in Section 1 makes clear that potential output must not, contrary to 
wide-spread beliefs, be assumed to follow a smooth trend over time. As discussed in 
Section 2, supply shocks that move potential output seem to be quite important for the 
Norwegian economy. That makes the measurement of potential output and the output 
gap so much more important. 
From the published reports and conversations with Norges Bank’s staff, it is not 
clear to us how these quantities are estimated by the Bank. A number of different esti-
mation techniques are discussed in Bjørnland, Brubakk, and Jore (2005). But the Infla-
tion Report publishes only one estimate of the output gap and no quarterly estimate of 
potential output (as discussed above), without explaining how the output gap estimate is 
constructed. We would recommend that several different methods are published and dis-
cussed in the Inflation Report. 
Much of the data needed for such estimations are the same as are used for informal 
judgments of the tightness of the economy, such as: 
• the unemployment rate, 
• employment growth, 
• capacity utilization, 
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• productivity, 
• wage growth, 
• unit labor cost, 
• price markups. 
Some of these data are currently available; others are not. Labor market statistics consist 
of registration data for unemployment, an ILO-compatible labor market survey, and 
firm based registration data. The latter are used in the national income accounts, but not 
in the labor market statistics. The ILO-compatible survey is carried out on such a small 
sample that the data are released only as three-month moving averages. Furthermore, 
and importantly, the population underlying the samples of this survey ex ante excludes 
guest workers—even legal ones—unless they have taken up domicile in Norway. Fi-
nally, the registration data for unemployment depend on workers’ decisions to register 
at the government labor agency NAV. Wage statistics were formerly collected by the 
employers’ association NHO, but this responsibility was recently moved to Statistics 
Norway, which publishes quarterly wage data. However, these data come with consid-
erable delays and cover only selected industries. Complete wage statistics are published 
annually by a special commission (“Teknisk beregningsutvalg”), where the social part-
ners are represented. 
We would recommend that the ILO-compatible survey be expanded to a true 
monthly survey and that guest workers be included. Preferably, the survey should even 
include the workers of foreign subcontractors that deliver services in Norway. Further-
more, we recommend that Statistics Norway conduct a monthly—or, at least, quar-
terly—establishment survey patterned on the one by the same name in the United 
States. The wage statistics can then be consolidated into this survey. 
Productivity statistics are not published on a regular basis. They can be constructed 
by the user, and this is done by Norges Bank. However, we recommend that Statistics 
Norway publish these series on a regular basis. The productivity and wage data can then 
be combined into estimates of unit labor costs and, in turn, price markups. 
Capacity utilization is currently published indirectly as part of the Business Ten-
dency Survey for manufacturing, mining, and quarrying, but curiously not for oil and 
gas extraction. Moreover, the figures are typically given as percentages of firms that 
find capacity to be a constraining factor for output growth, not as a percentage of capac-
ity utilization itself. We recommend that such statistics be constructed. 
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Current State of the Economy 
Forward-looking policy must be based not only on good forecasts, but also on a good 
assessment of the current state of the economy. This task is far from trivial. For exam-
ple, Loungani (2001a,b) and Juhn and Loungani (2002) report that a substantial number 
of recessions go undetected until they are essentially over. Part of the reason is that sta-
tistics are published with lags, sometimes considerable, so that the actual state of the 
economy at a certain time cannot be known until later. 
Norges Bank is obviously aware of this problem. There is, for example, some dis-
cussion of the uncertainty surrounding current estimates of the output gap, for example, 
in the box on pp. 48–49 of Inflation Report 3/06, although we also note that most dis-
cussions of the output gap do not take this uncertainty into account. Furthermore, the 
Regional Network of Norges Bank provides informal information from the business 
community in a timelier manner than official statistics. The Bank’s current Nowcasting 
Project is intended to provide further insight. 
International experience suggests that surveys often provide the best indications 
about the current state of the economy. On this background, we are struck by the pau-
city of such data in Norway. As mentioned above, Statistics Norway publishes the quar-
terly Business Cycle Tendencies for manufacturing, mining, and quarrying; but the form 
of this survey does not seem to serve actual needs. Private agencies have recently organ-
ized a monthly Purchasing Managers’ survey and a quarterly survey of Consumer Con-
fidence. Although these efforts are commendable, we do not feel they offer satisfactory 
substitutes for such surveys conducted by Statistics Norway according to international 
standards, such as those followed by EU member countries. 
Measures of Underlying Inflation 
Norges Bank publishes and discusses several different measures of “underlying” infla-
tion. Historically, the Bank has focused on the rate of consumer price inflation after re-
moving the direct effects of taxes and energy prices, that is, the CPI-ATE inflation rate. 
The main motivation to exclude taxes and energy prices has been that variations in these 
prices to a large extent are temporary and therefore do not affect the long-run rate of in-
flation. More recently, the Bank has noted that energy price variations have been more 
long-lived than expected, and it has therefore introduced other measures of underlying 
inflation, which exclude different components of the CPI over time depending on their 
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variability.21 A second reason to reduce the focus on the CPI-ATE inflation rate seems 
to be that it has recently been lower than the inflation rate measured by both the CPI and 
the alternative measures of underlying inflation, see Inflation Report 3/06. 
However, the role of these measures of underlying inflation in the analysis is un-
clear. One view is that although the inflation target is formulated in terms of CPI infla-
tion, monetary policy should not respond to CPI inflation as it is affected by temporary 
disturbances, citing the experience in 2003–2004 with large fluctuations in energy 
prices. This view, which is also reflected in the mandate for monetary policy, would 
motivate the use of underlying inflation measures. But this view seems to confuse the 
target for monetary policy from the indicator role of inflation: even if the target is for-
mulated in terms of CPI inflation, the current CPI inflation rate should not necessarily 
have a direct impact on monetary policy. If monetary policy affects the economy with a 
lag, there is no reason to respond to temporary movements in inflation that will disap-
pear before the policy response has a chance to affect inflation.22 This is of course why 
inflation targeting central banks typically make policy decisions based on a forecast of 
inflation, not the current inflation rate. 
Measures of underlying inflation can then be used as indicators of the inflationary 
pressure, or where the headline inflation rate is heading.23 But it must be clear which 
measure of inflation is the central bank’s target and which measure is used as an indica-
tor of future inflation. This is especially important because we find Norges Bank’s for-
mal mandate somewhat vague on this point, as discussed further in Section 4. Our ad-
vice is thus not to discontinue the publication of the alternative indices. Indeed, it would 
be desirable to make them more widely available by having Statistics Norway publish 
them on a monthly basis along with the CPI and the CPI-ATE. Our concern is rather 
that the alternative indicators should be viewed as a support for Norges Bank’s forecast-
ing efforts, rather than as targets to be aimed for. 
Finally, note that this discussion is based on the premise that the target is defined in 
terms of CPI inflation. The benchmark model introduced in Section 1 suggests that the 
target inflation rate should be defined in terms of a core index of those prices that are 
sticky. In any case, there must never be any doubt about what is the target rate of infla-
tion. A critical part of inflation targeting is the choice of a single inflation index that can 
                                                 
21 These measures are labelled trimmed means, weighted medians, volatility-weighted medians, and vola-
tility-adjusted medians. See Jonassen and Nordbø (2006) for details. 
22 See also Nessén and Söderström (2001). 
23 See Bryan and Cecchetti (1994). 
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serve as the nominal anchor. Then the central bank can explain errors in targeting the 
chosen measure after the fact. To do otherwise would undermine the central ideas of in-
flation targeting according to our conceptual discussion and run the risk of excessive 
discretion and loss of credibility for the whole enterprise.  
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4.  Mandate, Institutions, and Credibility 
Any evaluation of a central bank’s performance needs to be based on the Bank’s formal 
mandate. However, for such an evaluation to be meaningful, the mandate needs to be 
clear. We see some problems in this regard for the case of Norges Bank, and we discuss 
these problems in this section. We also comment on an important recent addition to 
Norges Bank’s communication, namely the publication of the Bank’s own interest-rate 
forecast. Finally, we discuss the institutional setup at Norges Bank. 
4.1  An Inconsistent Mandate 
The formal mandate for Norwegian monetary policy is given the Regulation on Mone-
tary Policy, passed as a Royal Decree of March 29, 2001 (see Box 4.1, English transla-
tion taken from Norges Bank’s web site). Since its formulation, this Regulation has 
been the subject of some debate because of its explicit reference to the exchange rate 
(the krone’s international value) as well as the inflation target, which is specified as the 
operational target. Previous Norges Bank Watch reports have contributed to this debate, 
in some cases by arguing that the exchange-rate formulations be taken out24 and in oth-
ers by criticizing Norges Bank for not having taken their responsibility for the exchange 
rate sufficiently seriously.25 
We support the former criticism. First of all, however, we want to point out an inter-
nal inconsistency in the mandate. For an economy subjected to terms-of-trade shocks, it 
is in general impossible to stabilize the currency’s internal and external value at the 
same time. This inconsistency is fundamentally different from the tradeoff between out-
put gap and inflation in flexible inflation targeting, which is implicit in the mandate’s 
mention of output and employment stabilization. That tradeoff is a temporary one; for 
sufficiently long time horizons, stable inflation is the only target. In contrast, terms-of-
trade shocks may well be permanent, so that the simultaneous stabilization of the ex-
change rate (external value) and the nominal price level (internal value) in general is 
impossible at all horizons. Although we are aware of the empirical evidence supporting 
purchasing-power parity for the Norwegian krone,26 we do not find this evidence strong 
enough to warrant formulations in the mandate that are mutually consistent only if this 
evidence holds up in all circumstances. In fact, we are inclined to interpret some of the 
                                                 
24 Norges Bank Watch 2000, 2002, 2004. 
25 Norges Bank Watch 2005, 2006. 
26 Akram (2007). 
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recent shocks to the Norwegian economy as permanent, or at least rather long-lasting, 
disturbances to the real exchange rate. The surge in domestic demand resulting from the 
oil wealth is an important example,27 but it is not the only one, as discussed in Section 
2. 
 
Box 4.1: Regulation on Monetary Policy 
Established by Royal Decree of 29 March 2001 pursuant to Section 2, third paragraph, and Section 4, 
second paragraph, of the Act of 24 May 1985 no. 28 on Norges Bank and the Monetary System 
I 
§ 1. 
Monetary policy shall be aimed at stability in the Norwegian krone’s national and international value, con-
tributing to stable expectations concerning exchange rate developments. At the same time, monetary pol-
icy shall underpin fiscal policy by contributing to stable developments in output and employment. 
Norges Bank is responsible for the implementation of monetary policy. 
Norges Bank’s implementation of monetary policy shall, in accordance with the first paragraph, be oriented 
towards low and stable inflation. The operational target of monetary policy shall be annual consumer price 
inflation of approximately 2.5 per cent over time. 
In general, the direct effects on consumer prices resulting from changes in interest rates, taxes, excise du-
ties and extraordinary temporary disturbances shall not be taken into account. 
§ 2. 
Norges Bank shall regularly publish the assessments that form the basis for the implementation of mone-
tary policy. 
§ 3. 
The international value of the Norwegian krone is determined by the exchange rates in the foreign ex-
change market. 
§ 4. 
On behalf of the State, Norges Bank communicates the information concerning the exchange rate system 
ensuing from its participation in the International Monetary Fund, cf. Section 25, first paragraph, of the Act 
on Norges Bank and the Monetary System. 
II 
This regulation comes into force immediately. Regulation no. 0331 of 6 May 1994 on the exchange rate 
system for the Norwegian krone is repealed from the same date. 
 
We thus recommend that the explicit mention of the exchange rate and exchange-
rate fluctuations be taken out of the Regulation. That is not to say that we ignore the for-
                                                 
27 Mork (2005). 
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eign-exchange market as an important channel for the effects of monetary policy on in-
flation as well as the level of real activity. However, we believe it should be made clear 
that it is the effects of exchange-rate changes on these variables that are important for 
the evaluation of monetary policy, not those changes themselves. 
4.2  The 2.5% Operative Inflation Target 
The level of the inflation target—2.5%—makes Norway stand out from most other 
economies with formal inflation targets. There may have been good reasons for choos-
ing this level in 2001. At that time, the United Kingdom—an important trading part-
ner—also had a 2.5% target. Furthermore, there was good reason to expect significant 
real appreciation as a result of the systematic fiscal expansion that was introduced on 
the same day in the form of the fiscal spending rule. Although hindsight might suggest 
that such real appreciation more suitably could have taken place via changes in the 
nominal exchange rate, the long tradition of nominal exchange-rate stabilization may 
have made it natural at the time to think in terms of differing inflation rates. 
However, these arguments are much less convincing today. 2% inflation targets 
have become the de facto international standard, especially after the Bank of England 
changed to this figure in connection with the switch from the Retail Price Index (RPI) to 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for the United Kingdom.28 The real-appreciation argu-
ment is weaker as well because we believe a good deal of this adjustment is likely to 
have taken place by the present time. 
Much monetary theory suggests that the ideal inflation rate should be zero, in other 
words price stability. In practice, formal inflation targets are specified as positive num-
bers, first, because essentially all known price indices are believed to overestimate true 
inflation, and second, to avoid the zero bound on nominal interest rates. Estimates vary 
as to the magnitudes of the upward bias of the consumer price indices and of the infla-
tion rate needed to insure against the zero bound. However, a 2.5% target seems higher 
than necessary. 
A problem with lowering the target at this time is that actual inflation, especially as 
measured by the index CPI-ATE, has been significantly below target since early 2003. 
Thus, it is very important to avoid the impression that the target is changed as a matter 
of convenience just to make performance look better. It should nevertheless be possible 
                                                 
28 The central banks of Canada, New Zealand, and Sweden all have inflation targets centered around 2%, 
while the Reserve Bank of Australia has a target of “2–3% on average, over the cycle,” and the European 
Central Bank has formulated their inflation target as “below, but close to, 2%.” 
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for the government to communicate clearly that the change is made as an adjustment 
toward the international standard, not for convenience. It would indeed be natural to in-
troduce this change as part of the modification of the mandate that we recommend 
above. 
4.3  Short-Term Volatility and Choice of Index 
While stipulating the inflation target as “annual consumer price inflation,” the mandate 
is not explicit on the exact index for inflation targeting. We consider this vagueness un-
fortunate because it can give rise to suspicions that Norges Bank may switch from one 
index to another so as to make its own record look better. Furthermore, although the 
central bank must have the flexibility to accept departures from the inflation target for 
the chosen index, e.g. when facing tradeoffs between inflation and employhment, it 
should explain the reasons for any protracted departure. Without a specific inflation tar-
get as a long-run nominal anchor it is very difficult to have meaningful conversation be-
tween the central bank and the financial markets or the government about monetary pol-
icy. And without such communication, it is impossible to have meaningful transparency 
or accountability. 
A practical example of the vagueness that we perceive is the question frequently 
asked as to whether Norges Bank targets the overall CPI or the CPI-ATE. Although 
Norges Bank repeatedly has emphasized that the ultimate target is the overall CPI, the 
mandate seems to give some support to targeting the CPI-ATE because it allows Norges 
Bank to ignore what it calls “extraordinary temporary disturbances.” Indirect tax 
changes are also mentioned explicitly. We consider this the formal background for the 
introduction of the index CPI-ATE, which ignores indirect tax changes and energy 
prices. Electricity prices were especially volatile in 2003–2004, raising headline infla-
tion to almost 5% in early 2003, followed by deflation of close to 2% when they nor-
malized a year later (see Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1: CPI inflation
Source: Reuters EcoWin
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The justification for ignoring such fluctuations seems to be that short-term fluctua-
tions are due to forces other than those that monetary policy should deal with and thus 
can be ignored as a nuisance. However, we do not believe that the duration of a price 
change is the key issue. As argued in Section 1.3, we believe that the case for inflation 
targeting should be derived from nominal stickiness, so that targeting efforts should be 
aimed at those prices whose movements are most clearly hampered by stickiness. The 
2003–2004 experience should be a clear indication that energy prices are not sticky. 
Thus, we recommend ignoring them even though their trend differs from that of other 
prices. In other words, we feel the issue should not be whether price movements are 
temporary or permanent, but whether or not they are hampered by nominal stickiness. 
In fact, as indicated in Section 1.5, we recommend going even further by exploring 
the possibility of instead targeting an index consisting only of domestically produced, 
non-energy goods and services, adjusted for indirect tax changes. As mentioned in Sec-
tion 1.5, we expect such an index to cover most of the markets where price stickiness is 
prevalent. Furthermore, monetary policy might be able to affect inflation in this kind of 
index more readily than in one including imported goods. For such a transition to be 
possible, Statistics Norway would need to publish such an index. That is not currently 
done; but it should be easy to do on the basis of the currently available underlying data. 
Again, however, we hasten to add that such switches should not be undertaken 
lightly or frequently. It is very important to avoid an impression that the target is ad-
justed for reasons of convenience. Theory as well as practice indicates that the robust-
ness of effective inflation targeting requires that absolute priority to be given to the sta-
bilization of inflation and the anchoring of inflation expectations. Norges Bank must at 
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all times have a clear sense of the specific index of inflation targeted, even if it has trou-
ble returning that index to target. Although we recommend that provisions be made for 
infrequent revisions of the choice of index as described above, such revisions must be 
made only for good reason and not more frequently than every five years. Doing other-
wise would risk compromising the spirit and integrity of inflation targeting, especially if 
the Bank were to rely too heavily on real indicators of inflation pressure such as the 
output gap instead of the gap between actual and targeted inflation, because excessive 
reliance on such real indicators can sometimes be highly misleading for inflation. 
4.4  Fluctuation Interval and Accountability 
The mandate only asks for consumer price inflation to be approximately 2.5% without 
specifying what “approximately” means in this context. The mandates of many other 
central banks, such as Sveriges Riksbank or the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, specify 
acceptable fluctuation ranges such as ±1 percentage point. A similar constraint for Nor-
ges Bank is included in the Government White Paper29 to Parliament of March 29, 2001 
on the formal switch to inflation targeting mandated by Royal Resolution the same day. 
It is also found in the correspondence between Norges Bank and the Ministry preceding 
this White Paper.30 
The formal mandate, like other rules and regulations, should be interpreted in light 
of this preparatory work. Thus, in this indirect sense, a ±1 percentage point fluctuation 
interval can be said to be part of Norges Bank’s mandate. However, we feel it should be 
included in the Royal Decree. That would not only make it more explicit and better 
visible, but would also remove any questions of why it was not so included. It would 
then have been easier to use it as a criterion for formally evaluating Norges Bank’s per-
formance. While Norges Bank should be commended for its efforts toward transpar-
ency, we believe that accountability is equally important for an inflation-targeting re-
gime to be successful. That, in turn, requires clear criteria on which the outcome of 
monetary policy can be judged. 
It is furthermore important that it be possible for criticism to be formulated incre-
mentally, in other words, that the government be able to criticize the central bank with-
out that criticism being read as a signal of total system failure or indeed an indication 
that the Governor should resign. The clearest example of actual government criticism 
                                                 
29 See http://odin.dep.no/fin/norsk/dok/regpubl/stmeld/006061-040003/. For an official English transla-
tion, see http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/FIN/Vedlegg/english/economic_policy/report_29_2001.pdf. 
30 This correspondence is included as annexes to the White Paper cited in the preceding footnote. 
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under the current regime seems to be the Finance Ministry’s letter to the Bank of June 
13, 2003,31 where the Bank was asked to account for the performance of monetary pol-
icy in 2002 as well as the first eight months of 2003. This letter asks open-ended ques-
tions about the performance of the exchange rate as well as inflation and real activity. 
We’ll get back to the issue of the exchange rate in subsection 4.5 below. Here, we note 
that this kind of letter could have looked less threatening if it had made explicit refer-
ence to an acceptable fluctuation interval. In the event, it could be read as questioning 
the very principle of inflation targeting rather than just the particular decisions made in 
the period in question. 
4.5  Publication of Interest-Rate Forecasts 
Since Inflation Report 3/05, released in November 2005, Norges Bank has published its 
own interest-rate forecast. The forecasted trajectory has furthermore been used as the 
basis for the Bank’s overall macro forecasts. This process is iterated so that the final 
shape of the interest-rate trajectory results in the best attainable combination of inflation 
and output gap within the Bank’s forecast horizon. In this sense, Norges Bank’s inter-
est-rate forecast can be interpreted as the optimal interest-rate trajectory (in the Bank’s 
view), although the Bank itself hesitates to refer to it as such. 
A number of observers have applauded the publication of this forecast as a major 
step forward in terms of transparency. We agree that increased transparency can be 
helpful to establish credibility for monetary policy, as discussed in Section 1. The publi-
cation of the interest-rate forecast serves two important purposes, namely, as guidance 
for the general public when making long-term plans, and as a benchmark for forward 
and future interest rates and bond yields in the market. 
However, it also exposes the central bank to weaknesses that would have remained 
hidden if the Bank had not made its view of future interest rates public. The main poten-
tial weakness is that the central bank may be unable to manage expectations, and this 
weakness becomes apparent if the expectations of future interest rates implicit in market 
yields deviate significantly from the benchmark provided by the central bank. 
Agreement and Disagreement with Market Expectations 
For Norges Bank’s first three publications of interest-rate forecasts, this was clearly not 
a problem in that the Bank’s forecasts on all three occasions corresponded very closely 
                                                 
31 http://odin.dep.no/fin/norsk/dok/andre_dok/brev/Utvalgte/006071-110152/dok-bn.html. 
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to market expectations both before and after the publication of the forecast. Figure 4.2 
illustrates this outcome for Inflation Report 2/06, published in June 2006. In this graph, 
the solid curve shows market expectations on the day before the report was published as 
the closing values for the 3-month Forward Rate Agreements (FRAs) with maturity 
dates at various future dates. The dashed curve shows the corresponding values for the 
following day, after the publication of the report. The dotted curve, labeled “Fair value 
new forecast,” shows the FRA rates for the same maturities that would have resulted if 
the market believed Norges Bank’s forecasts (the baseline scenario) in the June inflation 
report. Finally, the broken curve, labeled “Fair value old forecast,” shows the corre-
sponding FRA rates implied by the interest-rate forecasts contained in the previous In-
flation Report, published in March. The fair values are computed under the assumption 
of no term premium, but a constant 25 basis point premium relative to the policy rate for 
the bank risk involved in the interbank market. 
 
Figure 4.2: Interest-rate forecasts and market expectations, Inflation Report 2/06 
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As can be seen, except for the broken curve, the remaining curves are almost identi-
cal. This can be taken as an indication that the forecast revision was well anticipated by 
the market and that Norges Bank’s interest-rate forecast enjoyed high credibility in June 
of 2006. That is, Norges Bank and market participants agreed on the interest-rate path 
that would bring inflation back to target. However, the adjustment in the Bank’s rate 
forecast announced was not large, so this test admittedly has low power, if we may bor-
row a familiar term from statistics. 
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The case of Inflation Report 3/06, published in November 2006, was quite different, 
however, as can be seen from Figure 4.3. In this case, the forecast revision was larger. 
Yet, despite intense discussion among analysts ahead of the report, the revision was ap-
parently not anticipated by the market, as market rates from the day before the forecast 
release were not much different from those implied by the June forecast. Once the fore-
cast was published, the market did react, and in the same direction as the forecast revi-
sion, but only partially. A fair interpretation is that market participants more or less be-
lieved Norges Bank’s tightening plans through the end of summer 2007, but not the an-
nounced plans of continued tightening for yet another year.32 
 
Figure 4.3: Interest-rate forecasts and market expectations, Inflation Report 3/06 
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This case makes us somewhat uneasy. True, the deviation can be written off as a 
case of the market simply holding another view than Norges Bank of the shocks affect-
ing the Norwegian economy a year forward in time or of the transmission mechanisms 
propagating the effects of such shocks. For example, market participants may believe 
that Norges Bank over-predicts inflation or underestimates the effect of tightening on 
the exchange rate, both of which would be consistent with the points we made in Sec-
tion 3.2 above. 
                                                 
32 In Figures 4.2 and 4.3 we do not take into account the uncertainty surrounding market expectations or 
Norges Bank’s interest-rate forecast. According to the calculations presented in Inflation Report 3/06, the 
upper boundary of market expectations is close to the lower 50% confidence interval of the interest-rate 
forecast. 
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Disagreement Reflecting Constraints? 
We suspect, however, that market participants may perceive certain political constraints 
on Norges Bank’s policy that were not reflected in its interest-rate projections. Here, we 
are thinking mainly of the explicit mention of the exchange rate in Norges Bank’s for-
mal mandate. We are furthermore thinking of the special criticism that the government 
directed at Norges Bank after the 2002–2003 experience, when monetary tightening 
strengthened the krone to an extent that caused considerable political concern. This con-
cern was reflected, for example, in the letter of June 13, 2003, referred to above, and 
also in two Government White Papers that year.33 It would not be irrational for market 
participants to perceive these documents as defining a constraint on the extent of tight-
ening that Norges Bank can undertake in the absence of similar tightening among the 
country’s trading partners. However, we also consider such constraints alien to the spirit 
of inflation targeting and harmful to the general confidence in the system. 
We consider it essential that any suspicion of constraints be dispelled. We see no 
better way of doing that than taking the exchange rate out of the Regulation. That does 
not mean, of course, that we believe the exchange rate should be ignored. In fact, our 
concern with respect to Norges Bank’s exchange-rate forecast underscores that point. 
However, movements in the exchange rate should not be perceived as a constraint, but 
as a transmission mechanism for the effects of monetary policy on inflation and activity. 
Market expectations seem to have changed in the weeks following the November in-
flation report, see Figure 4.4. For up to a year ahead, market expectations are now actu-
ally a little higher than Norges Bank’s forecast. Beyond that horizon, market expecta-
tions level out relative to the forecast, but have risen from the levels right after the pub-
lication of the Inflation Report. Thus, Norges Bank’s interest-rate forecast may have 
gained credibility over time. However, this period also saw the publication of surpris-
ingly strong macroeconomic data, which seem likely to have raised market expectations 
even if Norges Bank had not issued its own forecast.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Specifically, the budget White Paper and “Kredittmeldinga.” 
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Figure 4.4: Changing market expectations after Inflation Report 3/06 
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Risks and Advantages of Disagreements 
This kind of discrepancy between forecasts and market expectations is one of the risks 
associated with issuing interest-rate forecasts. In general, if such discrepancies disap-
pear before too long, they might just reflect different assessments by the market and the 
Bank of current shocks and circumstances. That is to be expected and not an impedi-
ment to releasing the interest rate path. On the other hand, if the discrepancy persists it 
may create confusion and concern over where it comes from. This could eventually un-
dermine credibility for low inflation if it reveals a hidden constraint for monetary pol-
icy. Alternatively, a long-lasting discrepancy could be due to a difference of opinion 
about the structure of the Norwegian economy. This might draw the Bank into a discus-
sion of its structural view of the economy. Such a discussion can be healthy if based on 
a reasoned professional debate about modeling of the Norwegian economy for the pur-
pose of implementing monetary policy, and might lead to an improvement in the Bank’s 
structural model. But the Bank may want to prepare for such a discussion by carefully 
documenting its view. 
4.6  Institutions and Credibility 
To maintain credibility for monetary policy, private agents need to be convinced that 
decisions and analysis are made in a competent manner. So, how should institutions be 
designed to enhance credibility? There is widespread agreement that central banks 
should be operationally independent from politics. But an operationally independent 
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central bank needs to be accountable for its actions, and accountability calls for trans-
parency. Thus, monetary policy institution design typically rests on the notions of inde-
pendence, transparency, and accountability. In addition to enhancing credibility, well-
designed institutions will also increase the likelihood that transitions in the central bank 
leadership run smoothly.  
We have already made the case for central bank independence in Section 1, and we 
have also discussed transparency and accountability. Here we return to these issues in 
relation to the institutional setup at Norges Bank. 
Independence 
Norges Bank’s interpretation of the mandate for monetary policy rests on “flexible in-
flation targeting,” that is, the Bank should stabilize the rate of inflation but also seek to 
avoid inefficient fluctuations in output and demand. However, Norges Bank has not 
been given full operational independence in the pursuit of these goals. First, before 
making decisions on particularly important matters (including interest-rate decisions), 
the Bank must inform the Minister of Finance. The Governor of Norges Bank thus 
meets the Minister on the day before each Executive Board meeting to discuss his sug-
gestion for monetary policy. Second, the Government has the right to instruct Norges 
Bank. In such a case, the Minister makes a proposal to the cabinet, and the government 
decision must be made in a formal cabinet meeting presided over by the King, referred 
to as a decision by the King in Council. Also, Parliament must be notified as soon as 
possible, and Norges Bank is obliged to state its opinion.  
While the right to instruct has so far never been exercised, it constitutes an unusual 
restriction on central bank independence which may strain the credibility of monetary 
policy. The government and other political parties have in the past openly criticized 
Norges Bank for its decisions (for example, in 2002–2003), and there is no guarantee 
that such criticism will not lead the government to override the Bank’s decisions in the 
future.  At the same time, the right to instruct may also reduce the accountability of 
Norges Bank, as the government takes partial responsibility for the decisions made by 
the Bank.  
We therefore agree with several earlier Norges Bank Watch Reports that the right to 
instruct should be abolished and the meeting between the governor and the Ministry of 
Finance discontinued in order to safeguard the independence of Norges Bank and avoid 
suspicion that monetary policy decisions are politically motivated.  
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Transparency 
To enhance credibility, central banks need to convince the public that its decisions are 
well balanced and based on correct and relevant information. Central bank transparency 
is also important to ensure that the independent central bank can be made accountable 
for its actions. Finally, the publication of forecasts can help the central bank manage 
private sector expectations.  
As mentioned earlier, Norges Bank is more transparent than most central banks in 
the sense that it now publishes not only forecasts of inflation and the output gap, but 
also its own forecast for its policy interest rate. However, Norges Bank is considerably 
less transparent when it comes to the decision-making process. 
First, as indicated in Section 2, it needs to be more forthcoming regarding the ex 
ante information on which it bases it policy decisions. Ideally, immediately after each 
policy meeting, Norges Bank should release all the data it uses to make its decisions, in-
cluding not only a comprehensive contemporaneous review of the Bank’s assessment of 
current circumstances based on information then available, but also its use of formal 
models as well as the quantitative reasoning behind judgments made to amend or over-
ride these models. This would enable the Bank to be judged on the basis of ex ante deci-
sions, which would help secure its credibility against potentially bad outcomes that it 
could not reasonably have been expected to foresee or avert. Admittedly, this goal is a 
long way off, but it is a goal nonetheless. 
Second, the meeting between the governor and the Minister of Finance on the day 
before the Executive Board may reduce the influence of external members and give the 
impression that important decisions are made internally at the Bank and then rubber-
stamped by the Executive Board. 
Third, the Executive Board has decided against publishing minutes or voting records 
from its meetings. Furthermore, it has decided to speak with one voice to the public in 
the sense that only the Governor and Deputy Governor discuss monetary policy issues 
in public. We feel these stipulations may hurt credibility and public trust that policy de-
cisions are well-balanced. As mentioned in Section 2, there are always two sides to a 
monetary policy decision, and the most informed people to speak about the respective 
sides of the decisions are the Board members themselves, so that letting them all speak 
would be the most efficient way for the Board to have their respective points of view 
aired in a reasoned way. They can handle the media effectively by understanding that 
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their own differences are within reason. Explaining them as such would help avoid be-
ing pushed into extreme positions by the media. 
An important disadvantage of speaking with one voice is that suspicions may arise 
about serious internal division on the strategy of monetary policy or that the Bank is op-
erating under a stealth constraint not stated in its mandate. 
Finally, having external Board members who communicate individually with the fi-
nancial markets is a way of sustaining credibility for its operations. Because credibility 
not only is essential for monetary policy to be effective, but also difficult to sustain over 
time, Norges Bank should use every means at its disposal to secure its credibility. 
Norges Bank motivates the decisions not to publish minutes and votes or let external 
Board members speak in public with the argument that external members only work 
part time with monetary policy issues and therefore cannot be expected to possess the 
time and resources needed to make public comments and statements about policy. We 
do not find this motivation very convincing as it diminishes the importance of external 
members, which are useful both as a check on the Bank’s internal analysis and to bring 
other experiences to the Board. 
Some financial market participants appreciate the fact that Norges Bank speaks with 
one voice in public. However, without a transparent decision-making process, there is 
no guarantee that this official voice correctly balances the views of all Executive Board 
members. As already discussed above, an opaque process gives a false sense of the de-
gree of agreement with which a central bank can assess current circumstances, the risk 
of deviation of inflation from target, the prospects for output to deviate from potential, 
and the appropriate interest-rate path required to deal with these risks. Evidence from a 
variety of implicit and explicit inflation-targeting experiences around the world suggests 
that if a central bank is perceived to target inflation credibly with solid institutional sup-
port, so that inflation expectations are firmly anchored, then a more open process that 
acknowledges the uncertainties involved would make the markets more forgiving of 
short-term misjudgments of the state of the economy and the path of interest rates, and 
thereby improve the robustness of the regime.  
One possible explanation for the reluctance to publish minutes and voting records is 
that external members are in majority in the Executive Board, which consists of two in-
ternal members (the Governor and the Deputy Governor) and five external members. 
Making minutes and voting records public would then reveal situations where the inter-
nal members are in a minority, something which might cause embarrassment for Norges 
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Bank. We do not see this as a reasonable argument against transparency. Such fears 
should rather call for reforming the composition of the Executive Board by reducing the 
number of external members and increasing the number of internal members. This 
would also mitigate the problem that we perceive of identifying competent external 
members for the Executive Board from a relatively small population, an issue that we 
expect to become more pressing over time. 
We therefore recommend that non-attributed minutes and attributed voting records 
are published, and that also external members explain their views in public. Again, 
these recommendations echo earlier editions of the Norges Bank Watch. 
Accountability 
While central bank independence serves to enhance credibility, a democratic system 
needs to retain some control over the central bank. Therefore the central bank should be 
made accountable for its decisions. The Norges Bank Watch reports partly fill this role 
in that they provide an external evaluation of Norges Bank’s performance and help the 
Ministry of Finance formulate their own annual evaluation in the annual White Paper on 
financial issues (“Kredittmeldinga”).  
However, the ambiguities in the official mandate, discussed at length above, make 
evaluation difficult. To make the Bank fully accountable for its decisions, we would 
therefore welcome a clarification and modification of the mandate for monetary policy 
along the lines we have discussed. 
Similarly, as also discussed above, an effective evaluation requires more ex ante in-
formation on the basis that Norges Bank used for its policy decisions at the time they 
were made. 
Continuity 
We lastly point to the obvious fact that inflation targeting in Norway so far has been 
practiced under only one Governor. In preparation for future succession, we therefore 
consider it important that the principles of flexible inflation targeting be well anchored 
institutionally. Considering Norges Bank’s weak independence, it is especially impor-
tant that this be well understood in political circles.  
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Appendix: Meeting Schedule December 6–8, 2006 
Wednesday, Dec. 6 14.00–15.30 Ministry of Finance 
     Nina Bjerkedal, director general 
   16.00–17.00 Financial Supervisory Authority 
     Bjørn Skogstad Aamo, director 
 
Thursday, Dec. 7 08.00–09.30 First Securities 
     Harald Magnus Andreassen, chief economist 
   10.00–11.30 University of Oslo 
     Steinar Holden, professor 
   12.00–13.00 Norges Bank, lunch 
     Jan Qvigstad, executive director 
   13.00–14.00 Norges Bank 
     Svein Gjedrem, governor 
     Jarle Bergo, deputy governor 
   14.00–17.00 Norges Bank, Monetary Policy Division 
     Amund Holmsen, director 
   19.00–  Dinner hosted by Norges Bank 
     Svein Gjedrem, governor 
 
Friday, Dec. 8  09.00–10.30 Norwegian School of Management (BI) 
     Center for Monetary Economics 
     Arne Jon Isachsen, professor 
   11.00–13.00 DnB NOR 
     Kyrre Aamdal, senior economist 
   13.30–14.30 Nordea 
     Steinar Juel, chief economist 
   15.00–16.00 Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) 
     Stein Reegård, chief economist 
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